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Abstract—We consider the problem of designing optimal
online-ad investment strategies for a single advertiser, who
invests at multiple sponsored search sites simultaneously, with
the objective of maximizing his average revenue subject to the
advertising budget constraint. A greedy online investment scheme
is developed to achieve an average revenue that can be pushed to
within O() of the optimal, for any  > 0, with a tradeoff that the
temporal budget violation isO(1/). Different from many existing
algorithms, our scheme allows the advertiser to asynchronously
update his investments on each search engine site, hence applies
to systems where the timescales of action update intervals are
heterogeneous for different sites. We also quantify the impact of
inaccurate estimation of the system dynamics and show that the
algorithm is robust against imperfect system knowledge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, online advertisement has grown signif-
icantly and has become one of the most important advertising
approaches. According to Emarketer analysts [1], online ad-
vertising spending will reach 46.5 billion dollars in 2013 and
is expected to surpass 60 billion dollars in 2016. Among the
many online advertising methods, sponsored search has been a
very successful mechanism and has served as a major income
source for many search engines such as Google and Yahoo!.
Due to the popularity of sponsored search, designing ef-
ficient algorithms for it has received much attention, and
there has been a large body of previous work in this area.
These works can roughly be divided into two categories. The
first category of work aims at designing optimal algorithms
for maximizing the search engines’ revenue. [2] proposes an
online ad allocation algorithm based on online matching [3],
and proves that it achieves an 1 − 1/e competitive ratio.
[4] uses a primal-dual approach and designs a scheme that
achieves the same competitive ratio. [5] looks at the problem
of finding revenue-optimal rules for ranking ads. [6] formu-
lates the problem as a stochastic optimization problem and
proposes an algorithm to achieve near-optimal performance.
[7] designs algorithms for associating queries with budget
constrained advertisers and conducts system implementations.
The second category focuses on designing optimal bidding
strategies for the advertisers. [8] studies properties of greedy
bidding schemes and develops a balanced bidding algorithm.
[9] considers a single advertiser trying to maximize the number
of clicks given a certain budget and tackles the problem with
Markov decision process (MDP). [10] formulates the optimal
bidding problem as an MDP with large number of bidders. [11]
considers a single advertiser and proposes a greedy bidding
scheme based on stochastic approximation. However, we note
that the aforementioned works only consider optimizing the
performance of the advertiser or the search engine in the
ad auction process. Hence, they focus mainly on designing
algorithms for systems with a single search engine site. In
practice, however, an advertiser can typically utilize multiple
sites simultaneously for advertising. In order to maximize his
revenue, one must jointly optimize the investments at all sites.
In this paper, we consider a single advertiser who is trying
to advertise his product by utilizing a set of sponsored search
engines (called sites below), e.g., Google or Yahoo!. At every
time, the advertiser decides the advertising configuration at
each site, e.g., total budget and maximum pay-per-click, asso-
ciating ads to different keywords, and the bidding strategies,
and decides how much money to allocate to advertising at
each search engine. According to the advertiser’s customized
setting and the sites’ ad allocation and billing mechanisms, the
amount of money at a search engine site will be consumed at a
certain rate, and an amount of revenue will be generated to the
advertiser. After the money is completely depleted at a site,
the advertiser updates his investment at the site and resets his
advertising configurations, based on his investment strategy
and his observation of the site’s performance. The objective
of the advertiser is to find an investment policy to maximize
his time average revenue subject to his advertising budget.
This problem captures many features of the online advertis-
ing procedure at popular sponsored search engine sites such as
Google’s AdWords [12] and Bing ads [13]. However, solving
this problem is challenging. First of all, the advertiser has to
learn over time about how to allocate his investment across
different search engine sites subject to his budget constraint.
With the many different features and ad mechanisms of the
different sites and the many options of the advertiser, this is a
nontrivial task. Second, due to the intrinsic stochastic nature of
the online advertising process, the advertising performance as
well as the time to re-update the advertising configurations at
each site are highly dynamic and can be very different from
site to site. This imposes the constraint that the investment
strategy must be able to handle asynchronous system opera-
tions. However, most existing optimal control algorithms, e.g.,
[14] [15], require simultaneous update of the control actions
and hence do not apply in this case. Finally, optimizing time
average metrics defined over time-varying update intervals
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typically involves optimizing sum of ratios of functions. This is
in general non-convex and problems of this kind are generally
very hard to solve.
In order to tackle this problem and to resolve the aforemen-
tioned difficulties, we adopt the recently developed Lyapunov
technique for renewal systems and asynchronous control [16]
[17]. This approach has three important components: (1) a
virtual deficit queue with carefully defined arrival and service
rates as ratios of the corresponding system metrics, (2) a
Lyapunov drift defined over variable size time intervals, and
(3) a drift-plus-penalty-ratio principle in decision making.
These three components enable the development of a simple
yet near-optimal asynchronous control scheme called Ad-
Investment (AI), which allows asynchronous updates of the
investments and the advertising configurations. We show that
the AI algorithm achieves an average revenue that can be
pushed to within O() of the maximum, for any  > 0,
with a tradeoff of an O(1/) temporal budget violation.
We further investigate the performance of AI with imperfect
system knowledge and quantify its impact on the algorithm
performance.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we state
our model and problem formulation. In Section III, we derive
a characterization of the maximum revenue. Then, we present
the dynamic Ad-Investment strategy (AI) for the advertiser
in Section IV. We investigate the performance loss of AI due
to imperfect knowledge of the system dynamics in Section V.
Simulation results are presented in Section VI. We conclude
the paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present our system model. We consider a
single advertiser who is trying to advertise his products at N
sponsored search websites (called sites below), e.g., Google or
Bing, denoted by S = {S1, ..., SN} (see Fig. 1). We assume
that the system operates in continuous time, i.e., t ∈ R+.
G Y B
Advertiser
Investment
return
Fig. 1. A single advertiser allocates his advertising budget across multiple
search engine sites (“G,” “Y” and “B” in this example). The objective of the
advertiser is to achieve maximum revenue subject to his advertising budget.
A. Advertiser Actions
The advertiser first decides how much money to invest
at each site and specifies the operation configuration, e.g.,
the maximum pay-per-click, or which ads to play for the
keywords. Then, when the money deposited at a site is
depleted, the advertiser updates his investment amount and the
operation configuration for that search site, and the advertising
process continues. 1
1Note that our approach can also handle the more general case where
the advertiser uses other criteria for deciding when to update the investment
amounts and the advertising configurations.
Note that this operating mode is quite common in today’s
sponsored search engines, e.g., Google Adwords [12]. Under
the advertiser’s investment policy, each site goes through a se-
quence of asynchronous advertising (and freeze) intervals, de-
fined as the intervals during which the advertiser has nonzero
(zero) budget left at that site (Fig. 2 shows an example). In
the following, we will conveniently call an advertising interval
plus the subsequent freeze interval a frame.
Time
Time
Site 1
Advertising Interval
Site 2
Freeze Interval
t1
t2
t3
t4
t0
Frame 0 Frame 1
Frame 0 Frame 1
k1(t2)=1
Fig. 2. An example of the advertising and freeze intervals for a 2-site system.
The advertiser updates the configurations of the two sites asynchronously at
times t0, t1, t2, t3 and t4.
We use pn[k] to denote the amount of new investment the
advertiser makes to search site Sn for the kth advertising
interval. Note that this new investment will start a new
advertising interval. To allow the advertiser to temporarily
suspend his investment at a site, we assume that the advertiser
can always adopt a “freeze” option. Under this freeze option,
the advertiser will not make further new investment into
the search site for some time T frn [k] after the advertising
interval. We call this period the freeze interval. We assume
that for all k, the pair (pn[k], T frn [k]) is chosen from the
feasible (investment, freeze time) set Pn for all n. We assume
that Pn includes the option pn[k] = 0, and the constraints
0 ≤ pn[k] ≤ pmaxn and 0 ≤ T frn [k] ≤ T fr,maxn . One such
example can be Pn = [0, p] × [0, T ]. We also use mn[k] to
denote the operation configuration, for instance, the maximum
pay-per-click together with the maximum per-day payment,
or the targeted user groups, or what ads to display for the
corresponding keywords, or the bidding strategy to use at that
site for that frame. We assume that mn[k] ∈Mn, where Mn
is the set of feasible operation configurations at site Sn. We
assume that both Pn and Mn are compact sets.
Given the investment amount and the operating configura-
tion, the corresponding search sites will use their own pricing
and ad allocation mechanisms to allocate advertisement oppor-
tunities to the advertisers, e.g., the generalized second price
auction [18] or the VCG mechanism [19], and to generate
revenue for the advertiser, e.g., by bringing visiting traffic
or by directly bringing product orders to the advertiser, until
the advertiser’s new investment is fully depleted. However,
due to the dynamic nature of the advertising process, the
outcome at each site will inevitably be time-varying, e.g.,
the volume of the visiting traffic to the search site and the
set of keywords that are queried. Such a dynamic condition
will affect the site’s advertising performance, resulting in
different amounts of generated profit to the advertiser and
time-varying speeds in depleting the remaining advertisement
deposit at the site. To capture this dynamics, we denote the
duration taken to deplete the kth investment at site Sn by
T adn [k], and assume that T
ad
n [k] is an independent random
variable conditioning on the advertiser’s investment pn[k] and
the operating configuration mn[k]. We further assume that
there exists a function Fn[k] , Fn(pn[k],mn[k]), which maps
(pn[k],mn[k]) to the expected length of T adn [k], i.e.,
Fn : (pn[k],mn[k]) 7→ E
{
T adn [k]
}
. (1)
The function Fn(·, ·) is assumed to be known to the advertiser.
We assume that under any feasible actions, the frame size at
each site Sn is both upper and lower bounded, i.e., 2
0 < Tminn ≤ T adn [k] + T frn [k] ≤ Tmaxn . (2)
We denote Rn[k] the total revenue the advertiser earns
during advertising interval k from site Sn. Similar to T adn [k],
Rn[k] is also a random variable which is conditionally inde-
pendent of others given pn[k] and mn[k]. We also assume that
there exists a function Gn[k] , Gn(pn[k],mn[k]) that:
Gn : (pn[k],mn[k]) 7→ E
{
Rn[k]
}
. (3)
The function Gn satisfies Gn(0, ·) = 0, Gn(·, ·) ≥ 0,
Gn(p,m) ≤ νp for some constant ν, and Gn(p,m) < Gmax
for all n and all m, p. We also assume that it is known to the
advertiser.
In the following of the paper, for notational convenience,
we define common upper and lower bounds by dropping the
index “n,” i.e., Tmax = maxn Tmaxn , T
min = minn T
min
n ,
Rmax = maxnR
max
n and p
max = maxn p
max
n .
B. Budget Constraint and Objective
It can be seen from the above that the advertiser’s time
average revenue is given by: 3
Profitav ,
∑
n
limK→∞ 1K
∑K−1
k=0 Rn[k]
limK→∞ 1K
∑K−1
k=0 (T
ad
n [k] + T
fr
n [k])
. (4)
In practice, advertisers typically also have limited advertising
budgets. We model this by requiring that the time average
advertising expenditure is no more than some pre-specified
budget value Bav, i.e.,∑
n
limK→∞ 1K
∑K−1
k=0 pn[k]
limK→∞ 1K
∑K−1
k=0 (T
ad
n [k] + T
fr
n [k])
≤ Bav. (5)
Here the term on the left-hand-side (LHS) is the time average
advertising expenditure of the advertiser.
The advertiser’s objective is to find an investment strat-
egy that determines how to make the ad-investments, i.e.,
choosing pn[k], T frn [k] and mn[k], so as to maximize his
time average revenue (4) subject to the average advertisement
budget constraint (5). Below, we call a strategy that chooses
(pn[k], T
fr
n [k]) ∈ Pn and mn[k] ∈ Mn, and satisfies the
2Note that this is a reasonable assumption. If the advertiser invests nonzero
money (typically must be more than a minimum), it will take some nonzero
time to deplete the money. Otherwise if the advertiser suspends his investment
at the site, then he will specify a nonzero freeze time and resume later.
3Throughout this paper, we assume that all limits and corresponding time
average values exist with probability 1.
budget constraint (5) a feasible strategy. Then, we use Profit∗av
to denote the maximum time average budget-constrained profit
achievable over all feasible strategies.
C. Discussion of the Model
Our model is general and does not assume specific structures
of the system. The operation configuration mn[k] can be
used to describe the specific bidding policy used during the
advertising interval, i.e., automatic bidding or customized
bidding scheme, e.g., [8]. In this case, the functions Gn(·, ·)
and Fn(·, ·) represent the expected revenue and interval length
under such bidding schemes. Therefore, the strategies devel-
oped in this paper can indeed be implemented with the existing
bidding schemes. Under such general settings, solving this
problem is challenging, since the performance metrics in (4)
and (5) are equivalent to sum of ratios of functions and are
generally non-convex. Moreover, different search sites may
need updates asynchronously, whereas most existing optimal
control algorithms [14] [15] require synchronous action up-
dates at all components of the system.
III. CHARACTERIZING OPTIMAL REVENUE
In this section, we first present a theorem which charac-
terizes the advertiser’s maximum revenue. The main idea of
the theorem is that the maximum budget-constrained revenue
can in principle be computed by solving a complex nonlinear
optimization problem (typically nonconvex). The theorem will
later be used for our analysis. In the theorem, the parameter
V ≥ 1 is a constant introduced for our later analysis.
Theorem 1: The maximum time average revenue Profit∗av
satisfies V Profit∗av ≤ Φ∗, where Φ∗ is the optimal value of the
following optimization problem.
max : Φ ,
∑
n
V
∑∞
h=0 α
h
nGn(p
h
n,m
h
n)∑∞
h=0 α
h
nFn(p
h
n,m
h
n) +
∑∞
h=0 α
h
nT
fr,h
n
(6)
s.t.
∑
n
∑∞
h=0 α
h
np
h
n∑∞
h=0 α
h
nFn(p
h
n,m
h
n) +
∑∞
h=0 α
h
nT
fr,h
n
≤ Bav
∞∑
h=0
αhn = 1, α
h
n ≥ 0,∀n
(phn, T
fr,h
n ) ∈ Pn,mhn ∈Mn, ∀n, h. 2
Proof: The proof can be done by using an argument based
on Caratheodory’s theorem as in [14]. Omitted for brevity.
In Theorem 1, the values {αhn}∞h=0 can be viewed as the prob-
ability of choosing the investment-freeze-configuration triple
(phn, T
fr,h
n ,m
h
n) in every frame for search site Sn. With this
interpretation, we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: There exists an optimal stationary and ran-
domized investment strategy ΠS , which works as follows: for
each search site Sn, after each frame, chooses an investment-
freeze-configuration triple {(phn, T fr,hn ,mhn)}∞h=0 with proba-
bilities {αhn}∞h=0, independent of other sites. In particular, ΠS
achieves the followings:∑
n
V E
{
Rn[k]
}
E
{
T adn [k] + T
fr
n [k]
} = Φ∗,
∑
n
E
{
pn[k]
}
E
{
T adn [k] + T
fr
n [k]
} ≤ Bav. 2
However, as discussed above, due to the non-convex nature
of problem (6), directly solving for such a randomized policy
is very difficult. In the following, we instead develop an online
algorithm, which allows the advertiser to asynchronously up-
date his investment profile at different search sites and achieve
near-optimal profit. We will see that our algorithm only
requires greedy updates of each site and can be implemented
efficiently in practice.
IV. ONLINE ALGORITHM FOR ACHIEVING NEAR OPTIMAL
REVENUE
In this section, we develop an investment strategy to achieve
a near optimal performance for the advertiser. Our algorithm
is based on the renewal and asynchronous system optimization
technique developed in [16] and [17].
A. The Virtual Deficit Queue
To start, we first define the notion of decision points. A
time t is called a decision point if it marks the beginning of
an advertising interval for any site. Then, we use {td}∞d=0 to
denote the set of decision points. We see then the timeline is
divided into disjoint intervals by the decision points. Fig. 2
shows five such points {t0, t1, ..., t4}. Since each frame will
be at least Tmin long, we see that limd→∞ td =∞ w.p 1.
We use kn(t) to denote the number of advertising intervals
that site n has completed up to time t. Note that kn(t) also
denotes the index of the current advertising interval the search
site is in at time t. We denote δd , td+1− td the length of the
interval between decision points td and td+1. For our analysis,
it is also useful to define the notions of effective budget
consumption rate an[td], and effective revenue generating rate
rn[td] over the time interval [td, td+1) for each site Sn as
follows:
an[td] ,
pn[kn(td)]
Fn[kn(td)] + T frn [kn(td)]
, (7)
rn[td] ,
Gn[kn(td)]
Fn[kn(td)] + T frn [kn(td)]
. (8)
Here an[td] and rn[td] roughly denote the average budget
consumption rate and the average revenue generation rate.
Note that we use the expected value of the advertising interval
length in both (7) and (8).
Now we define the deficit queue process Q(td), to keep track
of the budget deficit due to temporal violation of the average
budget constraint. Q(td) evolves according to the following
dynamics:
Q(td+1) = max
[
Q(td)− µ[td], 0
]
+A[td], (9)
with Q(t0) = 0. Here A[td] denotes the aggregate budget
consumed by all the sites during [td, td+1), i.e.,
A[td] = δd
∑
n
an[td]. (10)
Similarly, µ[td] denotes the amount of “allowed” average
budget consumption, i.e.,
µ[td] = Bav(td+1 − td) = δdBav. (11)
We notice that since the update of Q(td) uses expected lengths
of the actual advertising intervals, Q(td) is an approximation
of the true deficit. However, we will show later that guaran-
teeing the stability of Q(td) also ensures the actual budget
constraint (5).
For notational convenience, let us also define cmax =
Tmax max[
∑
n
pmaxn
Tminn
, Bav]. We see then A[td], µ[td] ≤ cmax
for all td.
B. The Dynamic Ad-Investment (AI) Algorithm
Now we present our investment algorithm. In the algorithm,
S(td) denotes the set of search engine sites that just finish a
frame and will start a new advertising interval at time td. The
algorithm works as follows:
Ad-Investment (AI): At each time td, denote kn = kn(td)
the frame index of Sn at time td. For each search site Sn ∈
S(td), observe Q(td) and perform the following:
1) Choose pn[kn], mn[kn] and T frn [kn] that solve the fol-
lowing:
max : Ψn(td) ,
V Gn(pn[kn],mn[kn])−Q(td)pn[kn]
Fn(pn[kn],mn[kn]) + T frn [kn]
(12)
s.t. (pn[kn], T frn [kn]) ∈ Pn, mn[kn] ∈Mn.
Then, update the investment and the advertising config-
uration at Sn with the chosen actions.
2) Update Q(td) according to (9). 3
Denote Ψ∗n(td) the optimal value of (12). We note that since
Pn includes the option pn = 0 and Gn(0, ·) = 0, at the optimal
solution we always have Ψ∗n(td) ≥ 0. We also note that
the algorithm involves solving problem (12) for each search
site separately. Hence, the advertiser can easily update his
configuration at any site when the current frame completes.
This is quite different from many existing algorithms that
update all control actions simultaneously. Also note that (12)
can often be solved efficiently in practice, especially when the
actions sets Pn and Mn are finite. Finally, note that in every
step, we use Fn(p,m) and Gn(p,m) for decision making. This
requires the advertiser to have accurate prior estimation of the
system dynamics. As we will see in Section V that AI can
also be implemented with imperfect knowledge of the system
dynamics, and still achieve good performance.
C. Performance Analysis
Define the Lyapunov function L(td) = 12Q(td)
2. Then, we
define a 1-slot Lyapunov drift as follows:
∆(td) , L(td+1)− L(td). (13)
Using the queueing dynamic equation (9), we have the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 1: At any time td, we have:
∆(td) ≤ C0 −Q(td)
(
δdBav −A[td]
)
, (14)
where C0 , 12 (Tmax)2
[
(
∑
n
pmaxn
Tminn
)2 +B2av
]
. 2
Proof: See Appendix A.
Adding the term −V δd
∑
n rn[td] to both sides of (14) and
rearranging terms, we obtain:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rn[td]
≤ C0 −Q(td)δdBav
−δd
∑
n
V Gn[kn(td)]−Q(td)pn[kn(td)]
Fn[kn(td)] + T frn [kn(td)]
≤ C0 −Q(td)δdBav − δd
∑
n
Ψn(td). (15)
From (15), one sees that the AI algorithm is indeed constructed
to maximize Ψn(td) on the right-hand-side (RHS) of the drift
inequality for every Sn ∈ S(td). The following lemma shows
that AI also approximately maximizes
∑
n Ψn(td).
Lemma 2: Under the AI algorithm, at every time td, we
have: ∑
n
ΨAIn (td) ≥ max
Π
(∑
n
ΨΠn (td)
)
− C1. (16)
Here Π is any feasible investment policy in choosing
pn[kn(td)], mn[kn(td)], and T frn [kn(td)] at time td, and C1 =
2Tmax
∑
n
pmaxn
Tminn
is a Θ(1) constant independent of V .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 2 is important for our analysis. In practice, due to
the dynamics in the advertising process, sites typically do
not complete their frames at the same time. Hence, at every
instance of time, only some search sites need to update their
configurations. In this case, if instead a synchronous scheme is
applied, some sites will have to remain idle while advertising is
still going on at others. This will inevitably result in resources
being wasted. Lemma 2 shows that AI roughly minimizes
the RHS of the drift inequality (15) even with asynchronous
updates. This guarantees the near-optimal performance of AI,
as summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The AI algorithm achieves the following:
a) The average revenue under AI, denoted by ProfitAIav,
satisfies:
ProfitAIav ≥ Profit∗av −
C1
V
− C0
V Tmin
. (17)
Here C0 and C1 are Θ(1) constants defined in Lemmas
1 and 2.
b) At every time td, we have:
Q(td) ≤ V ν + 2cmax. (18)
Moreover, the average budget constraint (5) is satisfied
with probability 1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
By tuning the value of V , Theorem 2 implies that AI can
indeed achieve a revenue that is within O(1/V ) of the maxi-
mum, for any V ≥ 1, with a tradeoff that Q(td) = O(V ). Also
notice that (18) does not automatically ensure that the actual
deficit is deterministically bounded. This is because the actual
frame length is a random variable while Q(td) is updated with
the expected values. Despite this approximation, Part b) of
Theorem 2 shows that so long as Q(td) is stable, (5) will be
satisfied with probability 1.
V. PERFORMANCE UNDER IMPERFECT ESTIMATION
So far, we have assumed that the advertiser knows exactly
the expected revenue that will be generated during a frame
and the expected duration of the frame. In this section, we
consider the more general case where the advertiser only
has imperfect estimations of the functions Gn and Fn, and
quantify the impact of such inaccuracy on the performance of
the AI algorithm.
Specifically, we assume that now the advertiser does not
have the perfect knowledge of Gn(p,m) and Fn(p,m). In-
stead, he uses his own estimated functions Gˆn(p,m) and
Fˆn(p,m) for algorithm design and decision making. That
is, Q(td) and Ψn(td) will be defined with Gˆn(p,m) and
Fˆn(p,m), and (12) will be solved with them as well. In
order to quantify the impact of the estimation errors, we first
introduce the quality index of the estimations, ρG and ρF .
That is, we say that the advertiser has an estimation quality
(ρG, ρF ) if for all Sn,
|Gˆn(p,m)−Gn(p,m)| ≤ ρGGn(p,m), ∀ p,m, (19)
|Fˆn(p,m)− Fn(p,m)| ≤ ρFFn(p,m), ∀ p,m. (20)
Thus, ρF and ρG capture the inaccuracy levels of the esti-
mations. We now have the following theorem regarding the
performance of the AI algorithm in this case.
Theorem 3: Suppose the advertiser has an estimation qual-
ity (ρG, ρF ) where ρG, ρF ∈ [0, 1). Then, the AI algorithm
achieves the following:
a) Revenue performance:
ProfitAIav ≥
1− ρF
(1 + ρF )(1 + ρG)
Profit∗av −Θ(
1
V
)− NρGG
max
(1 + ρG)Tmin
.
b) Budget control: At every time td, we have:
Q(td) ≤ V (1 + ρG)ν + 2cˆmax. (21)
Here cˆmax is defined as the maximum change of Q(td)
defined with Gˆn(p,m) and Fˆn(p,m), i.e.,
cˆmax = (1 + ρF )T
max max[
∑
n
pmaxn
(1− ρF )Tminn
, Bav].
Moreover, the average budget constraint (5) is satisfied
with probability 1 if we replace Bav with (1 + ρF )Bav.
Proof: See Appendix D.
We note Part b) of Theorem 3 indicates that the budget
constraint may be slightly violated if the estimations of Gn and
Fn are inaccurate. While such violation is typical in this case,
Theorem 3 shows that as long as one uses a scaled budget in
the algorithm, i.e., use Bav/(1+ρF ), the original advertisement
budget can easily be guaranteed. This thus provides useful
guidelines for the actual algorithm implementation. Also note
that Theorem 3 applies to more general cases where the
system’s dynamics and the advertiser’s estimation quality both
vary over time. In this case, if the advertiser’s estimation
quality stays better than a certain quality (ρG, ρF ) after some
finite learning time, then one can invoke Theorem 3 and
conclude the performance of the algorithm.
VI. SIMULATION
In this section, we provide simulation results for our algo-
rithm. We consider the case when the system has two sites
{S1, S2}. For each site Sn, we assume for simplicity that mn
only denotes the maximum pay-per-click.
The Gn(p,m) and Fn(p,m) functions are given by:
Fn(p,m) =
κnp
m
, Gn(p,m) = γn
√
p
m
mq. (22)
The function Fn is chosen to model the fact that the expected
duration of the advertising interval is proportional to pm ,
i.e., roughly the number of times the advertiser wins the ad
opportunity. The choice of function Gn assumes that whenever
an ad opportunity arises, the advertiser wins the opportunity
with mq success probability, and that it roughly takes p/m ad
displays to generate
√
p/m revenue. For both Sn, we assume
that mn = {0.1, 0.2} and that the feasible (investment-freeze)
set is given by:
Pn = {(p = 0, T = 5), (p = 5, T = 0), (p = 5, T = 5),
(p = 10, T = 0), (p = 10, T = 5)}.
For each action, we assume that the actual revenue is uni-
formly distributed in [0.8Gn, 1.2Gn]. Also, the advertising
interval length is uniformly distributed in [0.8Fn, 1.2Fn]. We
set κ1 = 1 and κ2 = 2; γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 2; Bav = 0.2
and we use q = 0.2. We simulation the algorithm for
V ∈ {5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200}.
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Fig. 3. Performance of the AI algorithm. The legend ρF = 0.1(±), ρG =
0.05(±) means that Fˆn(p,m) = (1 ± 0.1)Fn(p,m) and Gˆn(p,m) =
(1±0.05)Gn(p,m). We see that when there is estimation error, using a scaled
budget value easily guarantees the original advertising budget constraint.
First, we see from Fig. 3 that as the V value increases, the
average revenue quickly converges to the optimal when there
is no estimation errors. In the imperfect estimation case, we
simulate AI with a scaled budget Bav/(1 + ρF ). In this case,
we see from the right plot that the actual budget never exceeds
Bav = 0.2. Also, the left plot shows that the revenue perfor-
mance of AI is always above 1−ρF(1+ρF )(1+ρG) Profit
∗
av (indicated
by the black dotted line), which implies that it is also always
no less than 1−ρF(1+ρF )(1+ρG) fraction of the optimal revenue with
budget constraint Bav/(1 + ρF ). These results are consistent
with Theorems 2 and 3.
To evaluate the effect of V on budget violation, Fig. 4 also
plots the average deficit queue size. We see that it increases
linearly in V . The right plot of Fig. 4 also shows the time
when the two sites update their configurations, for the case
when V = 20 and there is no estimation error. It can be seen
that under AI, the site updates take place asynchronously.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design optimal investment strategies for a
single advertiser who utilizes multiple sponsored search engine
sites simultaneously for advertising. An asynchronous invest-
ment strategy Ad-Investment (AI) is proposed. The algorithm
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Fig. 4. The left plot shows that the average deficit under the AI algorithm
increases linearly in the V parameter. The right plot shows that the advertiser
updates the advertisement and configuration of the sites asynchronously.
allows the advertiser to asynchronously update his investment
configuration at each site. We show that the algorithm achieves
an average revenue that is within O() of the optimal, for any
 > 0, while guaranteeing that the temporal budget violation
is O(1/). We also analyze the performance of AI under
imperfect system estimation and show that it is robust against
estimation errors.
APPENDIX A – PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Here we prove Lemma 1.
Proof: Squaring both sides of (9) and using the fact that
(max[x, 0])2 ≤ x2 for all x ∈ R, we have:
Q2(td+1) ≤ Q2(td) + (µ[td])2 + (A[td])2
−2Q(td)
(
µ[td]−A[td]
)
. (23)
Now using the facts that an[td] ≤ pmaxn /Tminn and δd ≤ Tmax,
we see that at any time td,
1
2
(A[td])
2 +
1
2
(µ[td])
2
≤ C0 , 1
2
(Tmax)2
[
(
∑
n
pmaxn
Tminn
)2 +B2av
]
. (24)
Multiplying both sides of (23) by 12 and using the definition
of C0, we sees that the lemma follows.
APPENDIX B – PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: To prove the lemma, we first recall that the Ψn(td)
function is defined as:
Ψn(td) ,
V Gn(pn[kn],mn[kn])−Q(td)pn[kn]
Fn(pn[kn],mn[kn]) + T frn [kn]
(25)
Here kn = kn[td].
If at time td, Sn ∈ S(td), then Ψn(td) is maximized over
all possible pure strategies, i.e., strategies that choose a given
(pn[k],mn[k], T
fr
n [k]) with probability 1. Now notice that for
any c1, d1, c2, d2 where d1, d2 6= 0 and θ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
θc1 + (1− θ)c2
θd1 + (1− θ)d2 = η
c1
d1
+ (1− η) c2
d2
, (26)
for some η ∈ [0, 1] [20]. Therefore, if a policy Π mixes two
pure strategies Π1 and Π2, i.e., uses two triples (p1,m1, T1)
and (p2,m2, T2) with probabilities a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, where
a1 + a2 = 1, then there exists ηΠ ∈ [0, 1] that:
ΨΠn (td) = ηΠΨ
1
n(td) + (1− ηΠ)Ψ2n(td) ≤ ΨAIn (td). (27)
By induction, we see that Ψn(td) is maximized under AI over
all strategies for all Sn ∈ S(td).
It remains to show that for any other Sn /∈ S(td), the
function Ψn(td) is also approximately maximized. Consider an
Sn /∈ S(td). Let t˜n be the last time the advertiser updates his
configuration at Sn before td, i.e., Sn ∈ S(t˜n) but Sn /∈ S(t′d)
for all t˜n < t′d ≤ td. Note that td−t˜n ≤ Tmax. This is because
the maximum frame length of any site Sn is bounded by Tmax.
Note that at time td, the site Sn is still operating under the
actions chosen at time t˜n, which is based on the queue size
Q(t˜n). Denote the actions chosen then by p˜n, m˜n and T˜ frn .
Denote p∗n, m
∗
n and T
fr∗
n the actions chosen at time td by
solving (12) with the backlog Q(td). Note that these actions
are not actually implemented because the advertiser will not
update the configuration of Sn at time td. Then, we have:
V Gn(p˜n, m˜n)−Q(td)p˜n
Fn(p˜n, m˜n) + T˜ frn
=
V Gn(p˜n, m˜n)−Q(t˜n)p˜n
Fn(p˜n, m˜n) + T˜ frn
− (Q(td)−Q(t˜n))p˜n
Fn(p˜n, m˜n) + T˜ frn
(a)
≥ V Gn(p
∗
n,m
∗
n)−Q(t˜n)p∗n
Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + T fr∗n
+
(Q(td)−Q(t˜n))p˜n
Fn(p˜n, m˜n) + T˜ frn
=
V Gn(p
∗
n,m
∗
n)−Q(td)p∗n
Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + T fr∗n
− (Q(td)−Q(t˜n))p˜n
Fn(p˜n, m˜n) + T˜ frn
+
(Q(td)−Q(t˜n))p∗n
Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + T fr∗n
. (28)
Here the inequality (a) is because p˜n, m˜n and T˜ frn maximize
(12) given Q(t˜n).
Using the queueing dynamic equation (9), we see that:
Q(td)− (td − t˜n)cmax ≤ Q(t˜n) ≤ Q(td) + (td − t˜n)cmax.
Together with the fact that td − t˜n ≤ Tmax, we have:
|Q(td)−Q(t˜n)| ≤ Tmaxcmax.
Using this in (28), we get:
V Gn(p˜n, m˜n)−Q(td)p˜n
Fn(p˜n, m˜n) + T˜ frn
≥ Ψ∗n(td)− C1n, (29)
where Ψ∗n(td) is the value of Ψn(td) with the actions p
∗
n, m
∗
n,
T fr∗n , and Q(tk), and C1n ,
2Tmaxcmaxp
max
n
Tminn
. This shows that
even for Sn /∈ S(td), Ψn(td) is approximately maximized.
Now by defining C1 =
∑
n C1n and using a similar argument
as in (27), we see that the lemma follows.
APPENDIX C – PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Here we prove Theorem 2.
Proof: (Theorem 2) (Revenue Performance) We first
prove the revenue performance. To do so, we recall the drift
inequality (15) as follows:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rn[td]
≤ C0 −Q(td)δdBav − δd
∑
n
Ψn(td). (30)
By Lemma 2, we note that AI maximizes the term
∑
n Ψn(td)
over all possible investment policies for up to a finite constant
C1. Thus, we can plug into the RHS of (30) any control
algorithm and the following holds:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rn[td]
≤ C0 + C1δd −Q(td)δdBav − δd
∑
n
ΨALTn (td). (31)
Therefore, we plug the randomized and stationary policy ΠS
in Corollary 1 into (30) and obtain:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rn[td] ≤ C0 + δdC1 − δdΦ∗. (32)
Taking expectations on both sides, carrying out a telescoping
sum from d = 0 to D − 1, and rearranging terms, we obtain:
V
D−1∑
d=0
E
{
δd
∑
n
rn[td]
}
≥
D−1∑
d=0
E
{
δd
}
(Φ∗ − C1)−DC0 − E
{
L(t0)
}
.
Dividing both sides by V
∑
d E
{
δd
}
and letting D →∞,
lim
D→∞
∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
∑
n rn[td]
}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
≥ Φ∗/V − C1
V
− lim
D→∞
C0D
V
∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
≥ Profit∗av −
C1
V
− C0
V Tmin
. (33)
It remains to show that the actual average revenue also
satisfies (33). Denote zp,m,Tn the long term average fraction of
time that the triple (p,m, T ) is used at Sn under AI. Because
for any (p,m), E
{
Rn[k]
}
and E
{
T adn [k]
}
are bounded, we
use the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) [21] to conclude:∑
n
limK→∞ 1K
∑K−1
k=0 R
AI
n [k]
limK→∞ 1K
∑K−1
k=0 (T
ad,AI
n [k] + T
fr,AI
n [k])
(34)
=
∑
n
∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T
n Gn(p,m)∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T
n [Fn(p,m) + T ]
.
Now fix a search site Sn, we see then for the td values that
are in the middle of a frame of Sn, rn[td] remains unchanged.
Let t˜n be the last time Sn starts a new frame before tD, and
let JDn (p,m, T ) be the set of frames during which the triple
(p,m, T ) is adopted at site Sn up to tD. Then,
D−1∑
d=0
E
{
δdrn[td]
}
=
∑
p,m,T
Gn(p,m)
Fn(p,m) + T
E
{ ∑
j∈JDn (p,m,T )
(T adn [j] + T
fr
n [j])
}
+E
{
rn[tD](tD − t˜n)
}
=
∑
p,m,T
Gn(p,m)E
{|JDn (p,m, T )|}
+E
{
rn[tD](tD − t˜n)
}
.
In this case, we have:
lim
D→∞
∑
n
∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δdrn[td]
}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
= lim
D→∞
∑
n
∑
p,m,T
Gn(p,m)
E
{|JDn (p,m, T )|}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
} (35)
+ lim
D→∞
∑
n
E
{
rn[tD](tD − t˜n)
}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
Since (tD − t˜n) ≤ Tmaxn , rn[tD] ≤ G
max
Tminn
, and
limD→∞
∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
= ∞, we see that the last term
vanishes. Moreover, it can be shown that for all Sn:
lim
D→∞
E
{|JDn (p,m, T )|}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
= lim
D→∞
E
{|JDn (p,m, T )|}∑
p,m,T E
{|JDn (p,m, T )|}[Fn(p,m) + T ]
=
zp,m,Tn∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T [Fn(p,m) + T ]
.
Using this in (35), we have:
lim
D→∞
∑
n
∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δdrn[td]
}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
=
∑
n
∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T
n Gn(p,m)∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T
n [Fn(p,m) + T ]
. (36)
This and (34) show that the average revenue satisfies:
ProfitAIav ≥ Profit∗av −
C1
V
− C0
V Tmin
. (37)
(Budget) We now prove that the average budget constraint
(5) is ensured under the AI algorithm.
We first prove (18). To see that (18) holds, note that cmax is
the maximum change of Q(td) during any interval [td, td+1).
Thus, if Q(td) < V ν at time k, then we must have Q(td+1) ≤
V ν + cmax. On the other hand, suppose now Q(td) > V ν.
Without loss of generality, assume that Q(td) is the first time
Q(td) > V ν occurs. One see that Q(td) ≤ V ν + cmax. Also,
we see that from now on until Q(td) drops below V ν again,
the advertiser will choose pn = 0 for any Sn that requires
update during this interval. This is because once Q(td) > V ν,
choosing any pn > 0 will result in Ψn(td) < 0. This implies
that an[td] = 0 for all Sn ∈ S(td) during this time. Hence,
the only possible increment of Q(td) will be due to the sites
that are in the middle of their frames. Q(td) will also start to
decrease once all the active sites complete their current frames.
Now it can be seen that this increasing interval will last for
at most Tmax long, and for each active site, an[td] ≤ p
max
n
Tminn
.
Thus, the maximum possible increment after Q(td) ≥ V ν will
be cmax. Combining this fact with Q(td) ≤ V ν + cmax, we
conclude that Q(td) ≤ V ν + 2cmax for all td.
This shows that the deficit queue with A[td] and µ[td]
being the arrival and service rates is bounded. Using a similar
argument as in the revenue case, one can show that:∑
n
∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T
n p∑
p,m,T z
p,m,T
n [Fn(p,m) + T ]
≤ Bav.
Using SLLN again, one sees that the LHS equals the average
expenditure with probability 1. Hence, (5) is satisfied.
APPENDIX D – PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We prove Theorem 3 here.
Proof: (Revenue) First, we prove the revenue perfor-
mance. Note that the Q(td) value is now updated with
Gˆn(p,m) and Fˆn(p,m). For convenience, we denote this
queueing process by Qˆ(td), and denote the effective revenue
generation rate by rˆn[td]. Then, using the queueing dynamic
equation (9), we can similarly obtain:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rˆn[td]
≤ C2 − Qˆ(td)δdBav
−δd
∑
n
V Gˆn[kn(td)]− Qˆ(td)pn[kn(td)]
Fˆn[kn(td)] + T frn [kn(td)]
≤ C2 − Qˆ(td)δdBav − δd
∑
n
Ψˆn(td). (38)
Here C2 , 12 ((1 + ρF )Tmax)2
[
(
∑
n
pmaxn
(1−ρF )Tminn )
2 +B2av
]
and
Ψˆn(td) is Ψn(td) with Gˆn(p,m) and Fˆn(p,m).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we will show that
the term
∑
n Ψˆn(td) is roughly maximized under AI with
estimation errors. To do so, note that the advertiser will now
choose pn,mn, T frn by solving (12) with Gˆn, Fˆn, and Qˆ(td).
Consider any Sn and td. Let t˜n be the last time when the
advertiser updates Sn’s configuration before td. Denote the
actions chosen at time t˜n by AI with Gˆn and Fˆn by pˆn, mˆn,
and Tˆ frn , and denote p
∗
n, m
∗
n, and T
fr∗
n any alternative feasible
actions. Also, denote σgn(p,m) = Gˆn(p,m)−Gn(p,m) and
σfn(p,m) = Fˆn(p,m)−Fn(p,m) the estimation errors of the
functions. Then, we have:
Ψˆn(td) =
V [Gn(pˆn, mˆn) + σgn(pˆ, mˆ)]− Qˆ(td)pˆn
[Fn(pˆn, mˆn) + σfn(pˆn, mˆn)] + Tˆ frn
=
V [Gn(pˆn, mˆn) + σgn(pˆ, mˆ)]− Qˆ(t˜n)pˆn
[Fn(pˆn, mˆn) + σfn(pˆn, mˆn)] + Tˆ frn
+
(Qˆ(t˜n)− Qˆ(td))pˆn
[Fn(pˆn, mˆn) + σfn(pˆn, mˆn)] + Tˆ frn
(a)
≥ V Gn(p
∗
n,m
∗
n)− Qˆ(td)p∗n
[Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + σfn(p∗n,m∗n)] + T fr∗n
+
V σgn(p
∗
n,m
∗
n) + (Qˆ(td)− Qˆ(t˜n))p∗n
[Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + σfn(p∗n,m∗n)] + T fr∗n
− Tmaxcˆmaxp
max
(1− ρF )Tmin
≥ Ψ∗n(td)
Fn(p
∗
n,m
∗
n) + T
fr∗
n
[Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + σfn(p∗n,m∗n)] + T fr∗n
−V ρGG
max + 2Tmaxcˆmaxp
max
(1− ρF )Tmin
(b)
≥ 1
1 + ρF
Ψ∗n(td)−
V ρGG
max + 2Tmaxcˆmaxp
max
(1− ρF )Tmin . (39)
Here in inequality (a), we have used:
cˆmax = (1 + ρF )T
max max[
∑
n
pmaxn
(1− ρF )Tminn
, Bav],
and the fact that |Qˆ((td) − Qˆ((t∗n)| ≤ Tmaxcˆmax. Ψ∗n(td) is
defined as:
Ψ∗n(td) =
V Gn(p
∗
n,m
∗
n)− Qˆ(td)p∗n
Fn(p∗n,m∗n) + T fr∗n
. (40)
In inequality (b), we have used the fact that Ψ∗n(td) ≥ 0. Plug
(40) and (39) back into (38), we obtain:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rˆn[td] ≤ C2 + δdC3 (41)
−Qˆ(td)δdBav − δd 1
1 + ρF
∑
n
Ψ∗n(td) +
δdV NρGG
max
(1− ρF )Tmin .
Here C3 , 2NT
maxcˆmaxp
max
(1−ρF )Tmin = Θ(1).
Now plug the stationary and randomized policy ΠS into
(41), we get:
∆(td)− V δd
∑
n
rˆn[td]
≤ C2 + δdC3
−Qˆ(td)δdBav − δd 1
1 + ρF
∑
n
ΨΠSn (td) +
δdV NρGG
max
(1− ρF )Tmin
≤ C2 + δdC3 + δdV NρGG
max
(1− ρF )Tmin
−Qˆ(td)δd[Bav − 1
1 + ρF
Bav]− δd 1
1 + ρF
V Profit∗av
≤ C2 + δdC3 + δdV NρGG
max
(1− ρF )Tmin − δd
1
1 + ρF
V Profit∗av.
Using an argument similar to the one used in the proof of
Theorem 2, one can show that:
lim
D→∞
∑
n
∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δdrˆn[td]
}∑D−1
d=0 E
{
δd
}
=
∑
n
∑
m,p,T zˆ
p,m,T
n Gˆn(p,m)∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [Fˆn(p,m) + T ]
≥ 1
1 + ρF
Profit∗av −
C2 + T
minC3
V Tmin
− NρGG
max
(1− ρF )Tmin .
Therefore, the actual average profit satisfies:
ProfitAIav =
∑
n
∑
m,p,T zˆ
p,m,T
n Gn(p,m)∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [Fn(p,m) + T ]
(a)
≥
∑
n
(1− ρF )
∑
m,p,T zˆ
p,m,T
n Gˆn(p,m)
(1 + ρG)
∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [Fˆn(p,m) + T ]
≥ 1− ρF
(1 + ρF )(1 + ρG)
Profit∗av
− (C2 + T
minC3)(1− ρF )
V Tmin(1 + ρG)
− NρGG
max
(1 + ρG)Tmin
.
Here in inequality (a) we have used the facts that Gn(p,m) ≥
Gˆn(p,m)
1+ρG
and Fn(p,m) ≤ Fˆn(p,m)1−ρF for all n and all p,m.
(Budget) We now prove the budget performance. Using
a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, we see
that Qˆ(td) is bounded by (1 + ρG)V ν + 2cˆmax. However,
different from Theorem 2, this does not imply that the actual
expenditure does not violate the budget constraint Bav. This is
so because the estimation errors make Qˆ(td) an approximation
of the actual expected budget deficit.
To prove our result, we denote zˆp,m,Tn the fraction of
time the triple (p,m, T ) is used under the AI algorithm with
imperfect estimations Gˆn(·, ·) and Fˆn(·, ·). Then, since Qˆ(td)
is stable, we have:∑
n
∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n p∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [Fˆn(p,m) + T ]
≤ Bav. (42)
Now using the fact that:∑
n
∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n p∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [(1 + ρF )Fn(p,m) + T ]
≤
∑
n
∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n p∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [Fˆn(p,m) + T ]
,
we conclude that:∑
n
∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n p∑
p,m,T zˆ
p,m,T
n [Fn(p,m) + T ]
≤ (1 + ρF )Bav. (43)
Using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, it
can be shown that the LHS of (43) corresponds to the actual
average advertising expenditure. This completes the proof of
the theorem.
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